

Message Text

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14

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 073156

R 240946Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3023

INFO /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 21

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 0858

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, ENGR, MASS, PK, BG, IN, XF

SUBJ: BHUTTO ON OIL CRISIS, INDIA, BANGLADESH AND SECURITY

1. MOYNIHAN AND I HAD A DELIGHTFUL LUNCH WITH BHUTTO AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 23 AT HYDERABAD AFTER BEING FLOWN THERE BY PAK CHOPPER FROM KARACHI. WE WERE JOINED AT LUNCH ITSELF BY CHIEF MINISTER OF THE SIND PROVINCE, GHULAM MUSTAFA JATOI, AND THREE OF HIS MINISTERS. THIS FOLLOWED ABOUT AN HOUR'S PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH BHUTTO ALONE.

2. WE TOLD BHUTTO NEAR THE BEGINNING OF OUR TWO PREVIOUS LONG TALKS WITH SHAHI AND AZIZ AHMED, GIVING HIM SOME FLAVOR OF WHAT MOYNIHAN HAD ALREADY HEARD. BHUTTO SAID IN THAT EVENT HE HIMSELF WOULD BE SPARED FROM RAISING DIFFICULT MATTERS WITH US, SOME OF WHICH HE KNEW BORDERED ON THE UNPLEASANT.

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3. WITH THIS AS A STARTER, THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO WHAT THE CURRENT OIL CRISIS IS DOING TO THE WORLD. BHUTTO SAID THAT ABU DHABI WAS URGING HIM TO MAKE A CASE AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE THAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WERE BEING

HURT JUST TOO MUCH AND THAT THE TREND WOULD NOT BE BENEFICIAL IN THE LONG RUN FOR THE OIL PRODUCING STATES THEMSELVES. HE SAID ABU DHABI WAS TAKING POSITION THAT THEY FELT PRICES HAD GONE UP TOO FAR TOO FAST. BHUTTO SAID THAT THIS WAS A DELICATE ROLE FOR PAKISTAN TO TAKE BUT THAT HE HOPED HE COULD FIND SOME WAY TO DO SO WITHOUT GETTING HIS FINGERS BURNED TOO BADLY.

4. I ASKED BHUTTO IF HE HAD THE TIME TO GIVE MOYNIHAN SOME IMPRESSION OF HIS VIEWS AS TO WHAT COULD AND SHOULD HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. BHUTTO SAID THAT PAKISTAN AND INDIA SHOULD GO RIGHT AHEAD ON NORMALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS. HE SAID IT WAS NOT AN EASY PROCESS AS IT INVOLVED A WHOLE RANGE OF THINGS FROM CURRENT PUBLIC OPINION TO HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES. AND, HE SAID, OF COURSE, THERE WERE QUITE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS KASHMIR. HE SAID INDIA OFTEN CLAIMED THAT IT COULD NOT PROCEED WITH SOME OF THE PAST AGREEMENTS ON KASHMIR BECAUSE OF PUBLIC OPINION. PAKISTAN, OF COURSE, HAD A PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM OF ITS OWN, BUT AFTER ALL THERE REALLY WAS A DIFFERENCE BECAUSE THE MORAL ISSUES WERE ON THE SIDE OF PAKISTAN.

5. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, HE THOUGHT THE INDIANS SHOULDN'T GET QUITE AS EXCITED AS THEY DID OVER HIS OWN REMARKS ON HIS RECENT TOUR OF AZAD KASHMIR. HE SAID HE WAS IN NO WAY TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE OVER THE KASHMIR QUESTION. HE IS IN NO POSITION, HOWEVER, TO GIVE HIS OWN PEOPLE THE IMPRESSION THAT A SELL-OUT WOULD TAKE PLACE ON KASHMIR, AS SUCH A STAND WOULD UNDER-CUT HIS POSITION IN TRYING TO WORK OUT AT SOME FUTURE TIME AN ACTUAL SOLUTION TO THE KASHMIR PROBLEM.

6. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO BE QUITE FLEXIBLE IN THE MATTER OF RESTORING RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH AND THE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM. HE PREDICTED THAT THE PRISONER EXCHANGE WOULD PROBABLY BE COMPLETED IN A CONFIDENTIAL

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COUPLE OF MONTHS, OR PERHAPS A BIT MORE (EXCEPT FOR THE QUESTION OF THE 195), BUT HE DOUBTED THAT MUCH COULD HAPPEN ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL AFTER THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY TAKE ALL OF HIS TIME AFTER COMPLETING HIS PRESENT TOUR OF SIND PROVINCE. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONFERENCE WAS OVER HE WAS PREPARED TO SPEND AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY ON THE BANGLADESH PROBLEM. HE SAID A COUPLE OF TIMES THAT HE WOULD RATHER WORK THINGS OUT WITH MUJIBUR RAHMAN IN A TWO-SIDED MEETING THAN HAVE THE INDIANS PRESENT. HE THOUGHT A MEETING OF THE THREE WOULD BE SOMEWHAT OVER AWKWARD, AS IT WOULD ADD NEW MEMORIES AND EMOTIONS OVER RECENT EVENTS TO THE TABLE. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, GO ALONG

WITH A THREE-WAY MEETING IF A MEETING OF THE TWO COULD NOT BE ARRANGED.

7. HE SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD RECENTLY OFFERED TO INVITE BOTH HIMSELF AND MUJIB TO INDONESIA SO THEY COULD MEET QUIETLY THERE. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD ACCEPTED THIS, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MEETING IN EUROPE AS IT WOULD BE A GOOD EXCUSE TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN SOME PLACE SUCH AS GENEVA. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE FROM BANGLADESH. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN MEDIATION EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOME FORMULA TO SOLVE THE /SOVEREIGN EQUALITY" PROBLEM IN CONNECTION WITH A MEETING. HE SAID AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED AN ACTUAL FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH MUJIB WOULD BE DE FACTO RECOGNITION. HE SAID THIS WAS A RATHER TOUCHY PROBLEM BUT HE WAS CONFIDENT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT.

8. BHUTTO SAID THAT WHEN KEWAL SINGH WENT TO DACCA THERE WAS CRITICISM THAT PAKISTAN WAS NOT PROCEEDING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE ON MOVING THE NON-BENGALEES TO PAKISTAN. HE SAID THAT WAS REALLY NOT CORRECT AS BANGLADESH APPEARED TO BEHAVING TROUBLE ON THE OTHER END ACTUALLY LOCATING THOSE FROM THE 25,000 WHO ALREADY HAD CLEARANCES TO COME.

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AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 0858

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

9. ON THE BROADER SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

INDIANS, HE SAID THE ATTER SEEMS TO THINK THAT IT SHOULD START WITH MATTERS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, TRADE, ETC. HE FELT THAT ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAD BEST COME FIRST, AS IT WOULD MAKE IT MUCH EASIER TO WORK ON THE OTHER MATTERS IF EACH HAD DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN THE OTHER COUNTRY. HE SAID HE COULD SEE SOME REASONS WHY THE INDIANS HAD NOT DESIRED AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE 1971 DEBACLE, INDIA HAD ENGAGED IN MANY STUPID AND SILLY THINGS. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE SAID THEY WERE QUITE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN FINANCING PEOPLE ACROSS BORDERS. HE SAID HE USED TO DO THIS SORT OF THING IN NAGA AND MIZO BUT HAD STOPPED THE PRACTICE AS HE REALLY DIDN'T THINK IT PAID OFF. SOME PEOPLE GOT RICH BUT DIDN'T SEEM TO DO MUCH TO REPAY FOR THE FAVORS. HE SAID THIS WAS SLACKENING OFF NOW BUT MADE THE POINT THAT IT WAS EASIER TO ENGAGE IN SUCH SKULDUGGERY IN THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ONE FROM THE OTHER SIDE IN-COUNTRY
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TO PROTEST. HE SAID THAT THE INDIANS HAD EVEN TRIED TO BUY OUT BUGTI WHEN HE WAS IN LONDON. THEY HAD FLOWN HIM TO DELHI AND EVEN INDIRA HAD SEEN HIM. HE SAID BUGTI HIMSELF HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT IT, BUT ON COURSE PERHAPS NOT ALL.

10. BHUTTO SAID ALL THIS TYPE OF THING SHOULD BE FORGOTTEN, AND THERE SHOULD BE GREAT EFFORTS BY BOTH THE PAKISTANIS AND INDIANS TO BEHAVE SO THAT THEY COULD LIVE TOGETHER BETTER. HE SAID INDIA SHOULD FULLY ACCEPT NOW THAT THE AREA OF WHAT WAS WEST PAKISTAN IS GOING TO MAKE IT AND BE A VIABLE NATION, AND WAS NOT GOING TO FALL APART. HE SAID THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS SHOULD MOVE FAST AND HE WAS PREPARED FOR HIS PART TO TRY TO MAKE THAT POSSIBLE.

11. BHUTTO SAID THERE IS ONE IRRITATION THAT REALLY BUGGED HIM AS HE CONTEMPLATED TRYING TO MAKE BETTER RELATIONS WITH INDIA. HE SAID HE WAS THOROUGHLY ANNOYED EVERY TIME THE INDIANS OVER-REACTED TO THE EXTENT THEY DID ON ANYTHING, HOWEVER MINOR, THAT WOULD SEEM TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN. HE SAID THE DISPARITY OF MILITARY STRENGTH WAS NOW SO GREAT THAT THEIR ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION ALMOST SEEMED TO BELIEVE THE NICE THINGS THEY SAY ABOUT WANTING PAKISTAN TO SURVIVE AS A STABLE NATION. HE MADE REFERENCE TO THE GERMAN-FRENCH SITUATION AND THE GREAT ANIMOSITY THERE AS A RESULT OF TWO WARS, BUT SAID THE FRENCH AND GERMANS TODAY DO NOT SEEM TO BE BICKERING AT EACH OTHER OVER THE STATE OF THEIR MILITARY FORCES.

12. BHUTTO WENT A LITTLE FURTHER WITH MOYNIHAN THAN I HAVE HEARD HIM GO BEFORE ON THE ATTITUDE OF HIS OWN MILITARY. HE SPOKE WITH FEELING THAT HE COULD NOT LET THEM BECOME COMPLETELY DEMORALIZED OVER THE PRESENT STATE OF THEIR

OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF PRIDE AND HONOR WITH THEM AND THAT DEEP FEELINGS ARE ENGENDERED WHEN THE MILITARY ARE PLACED IN WHAT THEY THINK IS AN IMPOSSIBLE SECURITY SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ALLOW THIS PROCESS TO GO TOO FAR, AS THEY WOULD BEGIN TO THINK CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP WAS NOT FULLY DEDICATED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS OF THE NATION.

13. BHUTTO SAID HE THOUGHT IT GOOD INDEED THAT MOYNIHAN
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AND I WERE GOING TO STAY IN TOUCH AND EXCHANGE VISITS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT MOYNIHAN COME HERE AND ABSORB SOME OF THEIR THINKING, JUST AS HE HOPED I WOULD DO IN INDIA. HE TALKED FOR SOME TIME WITH SURPRISING KNOWLEDGE AT THE BAD STATE OF RELATIONS AT TIMES IN THE PAST BETWEEN U.S. AMBASSADORS AND EMBASSIES, AND GAVE SOME RATHER LUCID EXAMPLES. MOYNIHAN AND I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE ON THE SAME TEAM AND WORKING FOR THE SAME BOSSES, AND THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS TO RE-ESTABLISH ITSELF.

14. IT WAS, BY THIS TIME ALREADY EXTREMELY LATE FOR LUNCH AND HE CALLED IN JATOI AND HIS MINISTERS FOR A COCKTAIL PRIOR TO LUNCH. IT WAS AN EXCEEDINGLY PLEASANT LUNCH OF GOURMET PROPORTIONS. BYROADE

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